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iEver since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its Members have found it very difficult to negotiate new commitments 
to liberalize access to markets for goods and services, let alone cooperate on “new” policy issues to address the spillover effects of 
domestic regulation on international trade and investment, or agree on trade-related policy disciplines to address collective action 
problems such as safeguarding biodiversity or combating climate change. Disagreements among large players, most notably the 
United States (US) and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations on one side and emerging 
economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other, have impeded progress on the traditional market-access agenda (mostly 
tariffs and agricultural support), precluding efforts to move onto new issues. Many of the latter are regulatory in nature, with the 
“problem” being that differences across countries in the substance of regulation of a product or production process and/or national 
conformity assessment processes create negative international spillovers and/or waste (since they represent excess costs for firms). 
Instead of deliberation in the WTO, the focus of attention in addressing such spillovers has been shifting to regional and plurilateral 
fora. Indeed, even on traditional market access issues attention has moved away from the WTO and towards preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs). But PTAs are now also venues where the trade effects of (differences in) regulatory policies are the subject of 
discussion, often building on bilateral or regional regulatory cooperation that has developed independently of—or in the absence 
of—trade agreements.
One reason for the use of PTA-centered trade strategies to discuss regulatory spillovers is that the traditional market-access agenda 
has become less important to OECD members. Average tariffs of these countries are very low and quotas have largely disappeared. 
The policy spillover agenda spans health and safety norms, certification requirements for services providers, policies pertaining to data 
security and privacy, and so forth. The rapidly changing composition of trade as a result of technical changes (for example, the increase 
in trade in services and associated cross-border ﬂows of data and services suppliers) is also making regulatory policies more of a trade 
concern for high-income countries (although it is equally a matter of concern for many developing nations). As products are more 
integrated with value-added services and connected to each other (the “Internet of things”), national regulation—whether driven 
by security, privacy, intellectual property, consumer protection, or industrial policy motivations—is moving centre stage. Because 
products are increasingly connected to the Internet/“cloud” and embody a variety of value-added services that involve cross-border 
data ﬂows, policies that limit or raise the cost of digital trade and data ﬂows are rapidly becoming more important. 
There is a vast literature regarding the potential rationales and motivations for government regulation of producers and products. 
Regulation has a critical role to play in addressing domestic market failures and to achieve societal objectives. There is also an 
extensive literature on the pros and cons of international standards and standardization. National standards and regulatory measures 
may act as barriers to trade, either deliberately or inadvertently. This is because while standards setting often reﬂects a “genuine” 
need to regulate to address a market failure of some kind, it can also be inﬂuenced by political economy forces, and, consequently, 
there is a risk of capture of the process. The political economy literature on product standards shows that these are often beneficial 
for economic actors, but that they can also be used for protectionist purposes. The same applies to domestic regulation, which can 
be captured to “raise rivals costs” or used as an instrument to discriminate against foreign suppliers.
The organization of an increasing share of production and trade into international value chains/networks means that end products are 
impacted by an ever greater number of regulatory jurisdictions. For example, World Economic Forum (2013) notes a case involving a 
chemical company that imports acetyl (used in aspirin and paracetamol) into the US. On average, the company had to comply with 
similar regulations from five different agencies that often did not coordinate and communicate effectively with one another, resulting 
in delays for one out of three shipments, with each day of delay costing it US$60,000. Empirical research has also shown that the 
costs for firms associated with differences in services regulation across countries are significant.
This paper focuses on dimensions of the interface between domestic regulation and the trading system; the implications for trade of 
differences in regulatory regimes across markets; and approaches that have been/could be taken to reduce the impact of regulatory 
barriers to trade globally. Each section has some illustrative questions and potential topics for deliberation in the E15 Task Force on 
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1INTRODUCTION
The ITO was supposed to complement the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the area of trade-related policy but 
never entered into force as a result of a decision by the US government not 
to submit the treaty for approval by the Congress.
See, for example, Bauer et al. 2014; Kommerskollegium 2014b.
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With the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995, much of the vision of the drafters of the 
1948 International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter was 
realized, albeit some 50 years later.1 However, since its 
creation, WTO Members have found it very difficult to 
negotiate new commitments to liberalize access to markets 
for goods and services, let alone cooperate on “new” policy 
issues to address the spillover effects of domestic regulation 
on international trade and investment, or agree on trade-
related policy disciplines to address collective action 
problems such as safeguarding biodiversity or combating 
climate change. 
Disagreements among large players, most notably the 
United States (US) and other Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) nations on one side 
and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on 
the other, have impeded progress on the traditional market-
access agenda (mostly tariffs and agricultural support), 
precluding efforts to move onto new issues. Many of the 
latter are regulatory in nature, with the “problem” being that 
differences across countries in the substance of regulation of 
a product or production process and/or national conformity 
assessment processes create negative international spillovers 
and/or waste (since they represent excess costs for firms). 
Instead of deliberation in the WTO, the focus of attention 
in addressing such spillovers has been shifting to regional 
and plurilateral fora. Indeed, even on traditional market 
access issues attention has moved away from the WTO and 
towards preferential trade agreements (PTAs). But PTAs 
are now also venues where the trade effects of (differences 
in) regulatory policies are the subject of discussion, often 
building on bilateral or regional regulatory cooperation that 
has developed independently of—or in the absence of—trade 
agreements.
One reason for the use of PTA-centered trade strategies 
to discuss regulatory spillovers is that the traditional 
market-access agenda has become less important to OECD 
members. Average tariffs of these countries are very low and 
quotas have largely disappeared. The policy spillover agenda 
spans health and safety norms, certification requirements 
for services providers, policies pertaining to data security 
and privacy, and so forth. The rapidly changing composition 
of trade as a result of technical changes (for example, 
the increase in trade in services and associated cross-
border ﬂows of data and services suppliers) is also making 
regulatory policies more of a trade concern for high-income 
countries (although it is equally a matter of concern for 
many developing nations). As products are more integrated 
with value-added services and connected to each other 
(the “Internet of things”), national regulation—whether 
driven by security, privacy, intellectual property, consumer 
protection, or industrial policy motivations—is moving 
centre stage. Because products are increasingly connected 
to the Internet/“cloud” and embody a variety of value-added 
services that involve cross-border data ﬂows, policies that 
limit or raise the cost of digital trade and data ﬂows are 
rapidly becoming more important.2 
There is a vast literature regarding the potential rationales 
and motivations for government regulation of producers and 
products. Regulation has a critical role to play in addressing 
domestic market failures and to achieve societal objectives. 
There is also an extensive literature on the pros and cons 
of international standards and standardization. National 
standards and regulatory measures may act as barriers to 
trade, either deliberately or inadvertently. This is because 
while standards setting often reﬂects a “genuine” need to 
regulate to address a market failure of some kind, it can also 
be inﬂuenced by political economy forces, and, consequently, 
there is a risk of capture of the process. The political 
economy literature on product standards shows that these 
are often beneficial for economic actors, but that they can 
also be used for protectionist purposes. The same applies to 
domestic regulation, which can be captured to “raise rivals 
costs” or used as an instrument to discriminate against 
foreign suppliers.
The organization of an increasing share of production and 
trade into international value chains/networks means that 
end products are impacted by an ever greater number of 
regulatory jurisdictions. An automobile has thousands of 
parts that are produced by hundreds of suppliers located in 
different countries. The engine may be made in Germany; 
a wiring harness in Morocco, and elements of the exhaust 
filter system in South Africa. Differences in standards and in 
testing procedures may imply that components as well as the 
final product are not interchangeable—a catalytic converter 
that complies with EU norms may not be accepted in Canada 
and vice versa. Akhtar and Jones (2013) cite the example of 
a US light truck manufacturer that wanted to sell a model in 
Europe—which “required 100 unique parts, an additional $42 
million in design and development costs, and incremental 
testing of 33 vehicle systems … all without any performance 
differences in terms of safety or emissions.” There are many 
such examples in the trade press and industry literature. 
For example, World Economic Forum (2013) notes a case 
involving a chemical company that imports acetyl (used 
in aspirin and paracetamol) into the US. On average, the 
company had to comply with similar regulations from 
five different agencies that often did not coordinate and 
communicate effectively with one another, resulting in 
delays for one out of three shipments, with each day of delay 
costing it US$60,000. Empirical research has also shown that 
2There is an extensive literature on the various options and experiences—see, 
for example, Vogel (2012) and OECD (2014). Much of the focus will (have 
to) be sector-specific—see, for example, Arnold (2005), Bismuth (2010), and 
Verdier (2011) in the area of services regulation.
See Kommerskollegium (2014a) on the TTIP and Bollyky (2012) on the TPP. 
Bollyky discusses the evolution of regulatory coherence as a matter for 
international trade negotiation, suggests provisions that would best achieve 
the goals of regulatory coherence and assesses what is likely to emerge 
from the TPP talks in this area, and the reasons why this will fall short of the 
stated ambitions of TPP negotiators. See also OECD (2013).
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the costs for firms associated with differences in services 
regulation across countries are significant (for example, Kox 
and Nordas 2007).
The following discussion focuses on dimensions of the 
interface between domestic regulation and the trading 
system; the implications for trade of differences in regulatory 
regimes across markets; and approaches that have been/
could be taken to reduce the impact of regulatory barriers 
to trade globally. Each section ends with some illustrative 
questions and potential topics for deliberation in the E15 
Task Force on Regulation and the Trading System and 
possible further research. 
In many cases regulatory objectives may be very similar 
across countries, especially economies that have comparable 
income levels, whether it concerns health and safety of 
products, food security, or minimizing risks and avoiding 
catastrophic events. If goals are very similar, regulatory 
cooperation can reduce compliance costs without 
undercutting the attainment of regulatory objectives. 
Regulatory cooperation may also offer the opportunity to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation—it 
can be an instrument through which outcomes are improved 
over time through a process of monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning. But regulation may also differ substantially across 
countries, reﬂecting different objectives or approaches. In 
such cases, cooperation may not be feasible or desirable until 
a certain level of convergence has been achieved. 
Research on the potential gains from improving regulatory 
performance concludes these can be large—just in the area 
of border clearance and transport logistics, convergence 
in regulatory performance towards half-way global best 
practice could increase real incomes by an average of 5 
percent (WEF 2013). In the case of the European Union (EU) 
and US, extending the degree of regulatory convergence 
achieved in the EU to the transatlantic marketplace could 
increase average real incomes in the EU by 6 percent 
(Felbermayr and Larch 2013); while the OECD (2005) 
concludes that regulatory convergence in services sectors 
could raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) by 
some 3 percent in the EU and US. Capturing these potential 
gains is difficult. In part, this is because of concerns of 
specific industries regarding adjustment costs of more 
foreign competition. In addition, there is often opposition 
DOMESTIC REGULATION,
TRADE AND INTER- 
NATIONAL SPILLOVERS
from groups concerned about the attainment of regulatory 
standards, including regulators themselves. International 
cooperation to reduce the market segmenting effects of 
differences in regulation confronts significant difficulties 
because of concerns that this will impede the realization 
of regulatory objectives, and the execution of the legal 
mandates and obligations of regulatory agencies. This has 
been a prominent feature in the talks between the EU and 
the US to establish a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). These factors explain why studies 
assessing the likely real income impact of recent trade 
integration initiatives suggest these will be far below the 
potential—the presumption is that there is little scope to 
address regulatory differences (for example, ECORYS 2009; 
Joint Study 2008; Francois et al. 2013). 
Given that a multiplicity of (different) regulatory policies 
results in international trade costs often being much 
greater than for domestic transactions, the challenge is to 
identify and assess the rationale and efficacy of alternative 
mechanisms that could be used to narrow the gap between 
the potential gains from reducing regulatory spillovers and a 
“business as usual” scenario. This is an area of policy where 
unilateral, autonomous reforms can generate significant 
benefits, but given that the source of trade costs and 
inefficiencies in part reﬂects differences in regulation for the 
same product, what other governments do also matters. 
Various approaches have been and are being used by 
governments to attenuate international regulatory spillovers 
(see OECD 2013). These include efforts to converge over 
time on the substance of regulatory norms (harmonization), 
and to rely instead on competition between rules and accept 
differences in regulation, while addressing spillover effects 
through mutual recognition agreements or processes, 
which seek to identify regulatory equivalence, and other, 
“softer” forms of interaction—such as increasing “coherence” 
across regulatory regimes by identifying good practices and 
common principles that jurisdictions should satisfy (such 
as transparency, consultations with stakeholders, impact 
assessments, and so on).3 Efforts to increase coherence 
across regulatory regimes have been a central element of 
international initiatives in the context of the OECD and 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and figure 
prominently in the TTIP and Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) talks.4 The focus here is more on processes than the 
substance of regulation. Cooperation moves into substantive 
issues, and can be characterized along a spectrum of soft to 
3hard (binding, enforceable) and shallow to deep. “Shallow” 
integration includes policy dialogue and is often basically an 
exercise in transparency where parties inform each other on 
their policies, and may agree on consulting before adopting 
new regulations. It also is limited to so-called negative 
integration—any agreement consists in applying domestic 
laws to imported goods and services (à la the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]/WTO). “Deep” 
integration includes harmonization, either in the form of 
“full” or “rigid” harmonization, or “minimum” harmonization; 
recognition; or regulatory equivalence. Recognition can be 
unilateral (without consideration) or bilateral/reciprocal, also 
referred to as “mutual recognition.” 
All of these alternatives can be embedded into trade 
agreements, and in practice are pursued as part of economic 
integration initiatives. Indeed, even the GATT contains 
sporadic references to harmonization and/or recognition. 
There is no legal obligation though, imposed on all WTO 
Members to harmonize/recognize. Negotiating similar 
instruments does not involve the standard mechanisms 
that are used to negotiate market access and reduce 
explicit discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods 
and services—a reciprocal exchange of commitments not to 
discriminate. In the case of regulatory policies, there is often 
no discrimination—measures are applied to domestic and 
foreign goods and services equally. The source of the trade 
costs lies in the differences in regulation across jurisdictions, 
and the need to comply with the requirements of multiple 
regulatory bodies in two of more countries. The primary 
“technology” of trade negotiations—reciprocity—cannot be 
employed. It is ineffective. 
Some forms of cooperation are more “costly” than others 
in terms of required “re-tooling” and some require “similar” 
levels of development across participants. Not all countries 
will be willing to adopt specific types of regulation and a one-
size-fits-all rule may well be inappropriate in any event. One 
could imagine instances of shallow regulatory cooperation 
that apply to all countries and deep cooperation for those 
who are willing and/or interested. An implication is that 
insofar as regulatory matters are dealt with in the WTO, 
this should not be on the basis of a “single undertaking.” 
Even the deepest integration process extant, the EU, has 
set this aside to permit the “thematic” monetary union, as 
well as the “non-thematic” “enhanced cooperation,” where 
subsets of EU member states can choose areas where they 
want to deepen the integration process between them. The 
“enhanced cooperation” mechanism that has now been 
institutionalized within the EU provides ample evidence that 
the group already lives in a world of “variable geometry” 
(Hoekman and Mavroidis 2015).
Some countries have already been cooperating on the 
regulatory front because of commitments they have entered 
into in PTAs. The EU, for example, has an institutionalized 
“loose” policy dialogue in its “Partnership Agreements” with 
its former colonies, and deeper cooperation with some of 
its OECD partners. Prima facie, the degree of homogeneity 
of the countries involved seems to dictate the nature of 
commitments made (“looser” with former colonies, “stricter” 
with OECD partners). There are areas where we observe a 
lot of cooperation (product standards), and there are areas 
where we observe almost no cooperation (labour market 
policies). It is helpful to reﬂect some of these distinctions 
in a matrix. Table 1 distinguishes between four degrees 
of international coordination on regulatory matters—(i) 
competition, that is, no coordination; (ii) coherence, that 
is, the adoption of common principles of due process; (iii) 
looser forms of cooperation such as agreement to consult 
on new proposed regulations or mechanisms to raise 
specific concerns; and (iv) deeper forms of cooperation 
such as mutual recognition agreements, recognition of 
equivalence, harmonization, or international standardization. 
This characterization can be applied to four types of 
country groups (“clubs”)—the world as a whole (universal 
applicability—for example, all WTO Members); high-income, 
“advanced” economies (for example, the OECD); subsets 
of countries (clubs) comprising a mix of high-income and 
developing economies; and clubs with only developing 
country members (for example, regional trade agreements).
Competition between regimes is the default or baseline 
situation, with different jurisdictions independently applying 
their own set of regulations to products and producers. While 
competition implies differences across countries, it need not. 
Over time, as learning occurs and/or firms have incentives 
to push for emulation of norms prevailing in larger markets, 
this may give rise to convergence. One standard outcome 
of transparency in this respect is the “mimicking” of the 
most appropriate regulatory intervention. Competition is a 
powerful discovery mechanism and a force that will help to 
identify more efficient forms of regulation to achieve a given 
objective. But competition may also have adverse outcomes. 
The commonly expressed fear of a “race to the bottom” is 
one possibility, albeit one for which there is generally little 
evidence. But much more frequent will be excess costs 
associated with different regulatory regimes that have similar 
objectives.
Coherence involves efforts among jurisdictions to ensure 
that the regulatory process conforms to what are generally 
accepted to be good practices—for example, ensuring that 
regulation is transparent; that there is the opportunity for 
stakeholders, including foreign firms and governments, to 
Adlung and Soprana (2013: 45).
Mexico reserves the right to grant research and development (R&D) 
subsidies and incentives exclusively to small service enterprises owned by 
Mexican nationals, whereas Ukraine’s schedule stipulates that the eligibility 
for subsidies and other forms of state support, including access to the 
financial and other material resources of the state, may be limited to small 
business enterprises.






4comment on proposed new regulations; or that the process 
of regulatory development should be informed by an impact 
assessment or a cost/benefit analysis. The aim here is not 
to question or discuss the objectives or the substance of 
regulation. Instead, the focus is on the process through which 
regulation is developed and implemented. Coherence is an 
important element of discussions on regulatory regimes in 
the recent mega-regionals (TPP, TTIP), is an element of WTO 
disciplines on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and has been the focus 
of work programmes in organizations such as the OECD 
and APEC for many years. Coherence usually addresses the 
relationship between “means” and “ends,” and, in this sense, 
is an instrument to “rationalize” policies. In more ambitious 
terms, it aims to provide some sort of harmony across 
policies, in the sense that interventions should not be very 
demanding in one area of public health and not so in another 
without good reason. The rationalization of domestic policies 
is the first step towards international coherence.
Consultation is used here to denote initiatives that go 
beyond agreement between countries to implement good 
practices (coherence) and that address the substance of 
regulation and its effects. An example is the scope that has 
been created in the WTO to raise specific trade concerns 
arising from (proposed) TBT and SPS measures, or agreement 
in a PTA context to consult with a partner or partners before 
implementing a new regulation in a given area.
Cooperation goes beyond consultation. Examples are efforts 
between regulators to determine instances where regulatory 
regimes are equivalent, agreements to (mutually) recognize 
a foreign regulatory process, or efforts to adopt common 
regulatory standards or conformity assessment processes. 
Such deeper forms of regulatory cooperation are difficult to 
achieve for a number of reasons. There may be (i) mandate 
gaps in that domestic regulators are not permitted to pursue 
cooperation or have not been given the resources to do 
so; (ii) coordination gaps in instances where international 
cooperation requires several regulatory agencies within 
a country to work together; and (iii) informational gaps In the case of the EU, there are of course 28 member states that continue to 
have significant autonomy in the implementation of regulation in many areas. 
5
within and across countries—for example, a lack of data on 
how a regulatory regime “works.” Addressing these gaps 
requires institutions and processes that foster learning and 
building trust through regular communication and repeated 
interaction. This is needed both across agencies within 
countries—frequently multiple regulators and government 
bodies are engaged in setting and enforcing product and 
process regulations—and across countries. Matters are 
compounded in federal states, where regulation is applied 
at the state level (13 provinces and territories in Canada; 29 
states in India; 50 in the US).5  
Regulators often do not consider the trade implications 
of what they do—not least because they are not called 
on to do so. They are the “owners” of many of the policies 
that affect trade opportunities. They may be limited 
in their appreciation of the economic effect and costs 
associated with implementation of their regime, and 
the possible negative competitiveness impact of each 
jurisdiction duplicating tests and certification requirements. 
A necessary condition for regulators to consider the 
(cross-border) economic implications of their work is 
that they have incentives to do so, which raises issues 
related not just to their legal mandates, but the design of 
institutional mechanisms that facilitate learning and a better 
understanding of the overall impact of regulatory norms on 
trade and investment incentives. 
As noted, a key requirement for deeper (more intensive 
forms) of regulatory coordination is that regulators trust each 
other’s regime. In practice, there may be a significant capacity 
constraint that impedes the implementation of whatever 
level of coordination is agreed between governments. 
This starts with the most limited form of coordination—
coherence. Basic principles such transparency, notification, 
deliberation, and allowing for comment from stakeholders on 
proposed new regulation may not be implemented because 
of resource constraints, a lack of understanding at different 
Global High-income “North-South” “South-South”
Competition Baseline situation Baseline situation Baseline situation Baseline situation
Coherence Some WTO agreements; non-
WTO sectoral initiatives
Core area of focus (e.g., 
OECD)
Element of some PTAs; 
APEC
Limited to date
Consultation Some WTO agreements; non-
WTO sectoral initiatives
Frequent; networks of 
sectoral regulators
Element of some PTAs, 
TPP 
Limited to date
Cooperation Sectoral examples: Codex 
Alimentarius; FSB
Examples in some PTAs: 
CETA, TTIP
Limited to date Limited to date
Alternative Types of Regulatory Coordination Across Country Groups Note: FSB: Financial Stability Board; CETA: Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement. 
TABLE 1:
5levels of government as to the agreements reached with 
partner countries, or what is in principle required by domestic 
legislation. This may mean that coherence is not attained even 
when this is the stated goal of the government. There is a very 
significant technical assistance and capacity-building agenda 
associated with improving regulatory systems and governance 
in developing nations.
Regulators frequently have their own mechanisms through 
which they interact with each other internationally. These 
are usually independent of trade agreements but may have 
similar effects—to reduce the market-segmenting effects 
of the measures that they adopt and enforce. Governments 
at different levels (central, sub-central, municipal), 
regulators, and multinational companies are all engaged 
in mechanisms that entail cooperation with counterparts 
across borders (jurisdictions). The same is true of the 
private sector. Companies set standards for quality, health, 
and safety for both products and processes that occur in 
their supply chains and increasingly cooperate in private 
standards-setting activities that have achievement of inter-
operability and minimum standards across supply chains as 
a goal—sometimes in cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and governments (for example, the 
Global Food Safety Initiative). NGOs do the same—there is 
a plethora of different private standards-setting bodies that 
develop norms and offer certification services to companies 
that engage in international trade. Thus, the characterization 
of levels of coordination in Table 1—competition, coherence, 
consultation, and cooperation—also apply to private 
standards.
Major international regulatory/standards-setting bodies 
include the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission, the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the like. 
International regulatory/standards-setting bodies that 
deal with services include the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), the UNECE, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Basle Committee 
and Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
and so forth. These bodies establish international regulatory 
norms and standards in their respective areas, many of 
which have been adopted by governments and the relevant 
national regulatory entities. If so, they become mandatory 
for suppliers that are active in the sectors concerned and that 
operate in their respective jurisdictions. 
Trade agreements can help generate the political oversight 
needed and support a process of identifying priorities 
for regulatory cooperation and moving towards greater 
coherence. An important feature of trade agreements is 
that there are a large number of interests represented and 
this can help identify what areas are priorities. Addressing 
regulatory issues in a trade agreement may help regulators 
by mobilizing additional resources and by reducing the 
extent to which they need to allocate scarce resources to 
areas where agreement has proven possible that regimes are 
equivalent. The benefits of regulatory cooperation accrue not 
just to companies in the form of lower compliance costs; any 
such reductions in operating costs for a regulatory agency 
will release resources for other purposes. 
The foregoing suggests many possible questions and issues 
that could be considered by the task force, including the 
following.
Questions 
i. How prevalent/effective are efforts to use different forms 
of international regulatory coordination as characterized 
in Table 1? What works (does not work) and why?
ii. Is there value in undertaking a mapping exercise of extant 
instances of regulatory cooperation? 
iii. What can be learned from existing sector-based frame-
works for regulatory cooperation such as those that exist 
for toys, wine, medical devices, civil aircraft, and so on?  
iv. How can trade agreements that cover regulatory matters 
be crafted in a way that makes them helpful in achieving 
the objectives of regulators—for example, increasing 
regulatory compliance?
v. What are the potential benefits of regulatory cooperation 
in terms of lowering compliance costs for firms and 
enforcement costs for regulators?
vi. How extensive and binding are national statutory barriers 
to greater cooperation between regulators? Does this 
vary by sector? Across countries? 
vii. What is the state of play regarding harmonization 
(international standardization) for regulation of goods 
and services?
viii. Are there issues of concern regarding private standards-
setting initiatives and approaches and public (mandatory) 
regulation from a trade system perspective? 
ix. What is the state of play on transparency and information 
on applicable regulatory requirements across jurisdictions 
and how do these relate to international norms where 
these exist? Is it necessary to improve transparency, and 
if so, how? 
x. What is the state of knowledge regarding regulatory 
competition issues (races to top/bottom) and the impact 
of trade (competition) in driving regulatory alignment, 
whether in desired or undesired directions? To what 
extent is convergence being driven by market forces?
6Allegations of protectionist abuse of product regulation 
(standards) have been the basis of numerous trade disputes 
over the years. These motivated the negotiation and 
inclusion of specific disciplines on product standards for 
goods in the GATT/WTO and the building of bridges between 
the trade and international standard-setting community. 
The key WTO agreements in this area are the Agreement on 
TBT and the Agreement on SPS measures, which provide for 
an elaborate test (when compared to GATT Articles III and 
XX) to address concerns about “protectionist” behaviour. 
The TBT agreement addresses technical requirements 
(mandatory standards) imposed by governments for goods; 
the SPS agreement deals with health and safety-related 
norms for agricultural products (foodstuffs, plant and animal 
health). Both agreements provide “ports of entry” to the 
WTO for product standards that have been established in 
specialized fora elsewhere and incorporated into national 
law or otherwise made mandatory by governments. Thus, 
the SPS agreement makes explicit reference to an indicative 
list of international bodies to promulgate SPS norms, such 
as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The WTO does not 
get involved in establishing the content of product-specific 
technical requirements. The two agreements provide a means 
for WTO Members to “in-source” the results of international 
cooperation on product safety-related norms. In principle, 
the use of international standards reduces the trade-
impeding effects of countries adopting different standards 
for identical products by lowering trade costs and facilitating 
access to markets for firms no matter where they are located. 
One reason why two standards-specific sets of disciplines 
for goods exist in the WTO is that the health and 
safety concerns that arise in the production, trade, and 
consumption of food, plant life, and animals are considered 
to be particularly important—in effect many SPS norms can 
be characterized as measures that are aimed at catastrophe 
avoidance such as the spread of diseases, the probability of 
serious illness, and so on. Such considerations also arise 
with technical barriers to trade as these may have similar 
motivations—for example, a ban on the use of lead paint; 
radioactive residues, and the like—but they often address 
other types of issues as well (for example, radio frequency 
interference; interoperability; and so forth).6
The WTO defines a technical regulation as (usually) 
“labeling” and “packaging” requirements that apply to 
an identifiable product or group of products, and which 
specify technical characteristics for these products (for 
example, relating to composition and characteristics such 
as ﬂammability, texture, density, toxicity, and so forth). 
Compliance with technical regulations is mandatory, that 
is, products that do not comply will not be allowed in the 
market at all. Such measures fall under the aegis of Art. III 
GATT, the national treatment rule. The TBT agreement goes 
further than national treatment by requiring that Members 
base their product regulation on available international 
standards (whenever appropriate), and adopt the least 
trade restrictive measure that is necessary to achieve their 
regulatory objective.7
The TBT agreement thus encourages the use of international 
standards where these exist as a way reducing transactions 
costs. International standardizing bodies provide a forum 
for governments and industry to debate on the need to 
regulate and cooperate on the design of standards. The 
international standards that emerge will reﬂect a common 
view of how best to address a specific need to regulate 
through the adoption of a technical measure. Under the TBT 
agreement, there is a presumption that such international 
standards are least trade restrictive in that the norms are 
considered to satisfy the necessity test. There is, however, 
no guarantee that this is the case, as the process of 
international standardization may devote as little attention 
to trade effects as do domestic norm-setting procedures. The 
presumption is that by having many countries involved in the 
norm development process, whatever is agreed is regarded 
as being non-discriminatory in intent, no matter the actual 
effect on trade.
Production and processing methods (PPMs) are also covered 
by the TBT agreement, irrespective of whether they have 
been incorporated in the final product or not. In US-Tuna II 
(Mexico), for example, the WTO Appellate Body confirmed 
the applicability of the TBT on a US labeling scheme 
concerning a non-incorporated process of production. In US-
Clove Cigarettes, the opposite has been the case. Many of 
the standards that confront firms operating internationally 
address management processes and production methods. 
Systems such as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 are used by 
companies as a signal of quality, a demonstration of a 
commitment to social responsibility, or as requirements 
that must be met by suppliers in a trade relationship with 
buyers, or by companies that are part of international value 
chains and production networks. Standards of this type are 
not covered by the WTO. The same applies to labels and 
certification marks insofar as these pertain to the way a 
product was produced as opposed to its content or physical 
characteristics.
Conformity assessment procedures for technical 
product regulations are subject to WTO disciplines, 
including the non-discrimination rule. Relevant guides or 
recommendations issued by international standardizing 
bodies are to be used if they exist, except if inappropriate for 
It is not clear why we have two agreements on product standards in the 
WTO. One explanation for the inclusion of SPS is that it was regarded 
as an insurance policy to prevent circumvention of agricultural policy 
commitments. If so, it is idiosyncratic for this reason alone.
For space reasons, what follows focuses on the TBT agreement. Similar 
considerations apply to the SPS agreement.
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7national security reasons or deemed inadequate to safeguard 
health and safety. In principle, WTO Members are free to join 
and use international systems for conformity assessment. 
The results of conformity assessment procedures undertaken 
in exporting countries must be accepted if consultations 
determine these are equivalent to domestic ones. WTO 
Members are encouraged to negotiate mutual recognition 
agreements for conformity assessment procedures, and not 
to discriminate between foreign certification bodies in their 
access to such agreements.
Much prevailing regulation deals with services. The WTO 
has fewer disciplines for regulations affecting services than 
for goods (product regulation). Art. VI.4 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) calls on the Council 
for Trade in Services to develop any necessary disciplines to 
ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards, and licensing 
requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade 
in services.8 Members may not apply regulatory requirements 
so as to nullify or impair specific commitments made for 
sectors/modes (Art. VI.5[a]). The GATS therefore embodies 
a “least trade restrictive” norm for technical standards. 
However, there is no obligation to use international 
standards—the GATS leaves it open to WTO Members to use 
whatever standards they wish. 
GATS Article VII (Recognition) promotes the establishment 
of procedures for (mutual) recognition of licenses, 
educational diplomas, and experience granted by a particular 
Member. It permits a Member to recognize standards of one 
or more Members, but does not require, or even encourage, 
Members to recognize equivalent foreign regulations. Art 
VII:2 requires a Member who enters into a mutual recognition 
agreement (MRA) to afford adequate opportunity to other 
interested Members to negotiate their accession to such 
an agreement or to negotiate comparable ones. Art. VII:3 
stipulates that a Member must not grant recognition in a 
manner which would constitute a means of discrimination 
between countries. Members must inform the Council for 
Trade in Services about existing MRAs and of the opening 
of negotiations on any future ones. Most such notifications 
pertain to the recognition of educational degrees and 
professional qualifications obtained abroad.
Finally, the WTO includes disciplines that require minimum 
levels of regulation—for example, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
requires Members to implement minimum standards of 
protection for intellectual property. However the substance 
of the rights and requirements/criteria involved are left to 
other international bodies to determine/discuss. 
We can conclude as follows. The most elaborate regulatory 
interface under the aegis of the WTO is in the realm of TBT/
SPS. WTO Members must establish outlets at the national 
level to “familiarize” traders with their interventions, and 
must further provide them with enough time to adjust to 
the new regulatory reality. At the WTO Committee-level, 
Members have adequate opportunities to inquire into 
the rationale for national measures, the deviation from 
international standards on occasion, and to even contest 
the legitimacy of national practices through an informal 
procedure that is rapidly gaining pace, the so-called specific 
trade concerns (STCs).
Questions 
i. To what extent is there a need/role for the WTO to do 
more on coherence, consultation, and cooperation in the 
area of regulation? 
ii. Should more focus be given to services and to cross-
border data ﬂows/digital economy-related regulation? If 
so, how could this be pursued? Is there a need for a TBT-
type agreement for services?
iii. Should countries be thinking of cooperating on/
addressing regulatory issues on the basis of the 
underlying motivation? For example, health and safety vs. 
connectivity, interoperability, and so forth?
iv. Can an approach based on the “least trade restrictive” 
concept found in the TBT agreement—see UNECE (2014), 
for example—be applied to other areas of regulation? If 
so, what does this mean and how can it be assessed in 
practice?
v. Much regulation focuses on so-called PPMs. This is 
also true for private standards setting. Is this an area of 
regulation where multilateral disciplines are needed? If 
so, is there a need to distinguish between types of PPMs?
vi. Should there be greater effort to improve transparency 
and knowledge of the trade effects of regulation? 
Can/should the WTO become more of a forum where 
deliberation occurs on regulatory matters in areas not 
subject to multilateral disciplines?
vii. Is there potential to build on initiatives that have already 
occurred in the WTO—for example using Committees to 
address STCs?
A Working Party on Domestic Regulation was mandated to develop 
disciplines called for by Art. VI:4 to ensure that licensing and qualification 
requirements and related standards are not unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services. A precursor to this working party, the Working Party 
on Professional Services, agreed in 1998 on a set of principles to ensure 
transparency of regulations pertaining to licensing of accountants and 
accountancy services.
8
8A Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of the Compliance and 
Enforcement Programme regarding Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP) for Pharmaceutical Products makes provisions for determination 
of the equivalence of regulatory authorities that certify compliance 
with these practices. Annex II of this Protocol (on Medicinal Products 
or Drugs) lists a set of medicinal products or drugs where it has been 
agreed that the GMP requirements and compliance programs of both 
parties are equivalent. Some mention of regulatory equivalence also 
occurs in the chapter on financial services. This permits Canadian 
institutions to provide portfolio management services to EU 
professional clients on a cross-border basis (that is, without having to 
establish in the EU) once the European Commission has adopted the 
equivalence decision related to portfolio management (EU prudential 
requirements still apply).
The literature investigating the effects of regional harmonization of 
standards has found that this may benefit excluded countries as long 
as they have the capacity to satisfy the norms and mechanisms that are 
adopted by a PTA. Research on the TTIP incorporates guesstimates of 
the potential positive spillover effects of deeper transatlantic market 
integration. See Francois et al. (2013) and Egger et al. (2015). 
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As noted, regulatory coherence, consultation, and coope-
ration are features of recent PTAs between OECD members 
and is on the agenda of the TPP and TTIP negotiations. It 
is also an element of trade integration agreements that 
have been in place for a longer time such as the Australia-
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA). Innovative processes and institutions have also 
been set up in the “shadow” of trade agreements to address 
regulatory differences—such as the Regulatory Cooperation 
Council between Canada and the US. The EU is, of course, sui 
generis in this domain.
The recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the EU illustrates what is being 
done. The majority of the substantive chapters of the CETA 
deal with non-tariff and regulatory policies, including TBT 
and SPS measures; customs and trade facilitation procedures; 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications; domestic 
regulation more generally; and procedures for regulatory 
cooperation, including protocols on the mutual acceptance 
of the results of conformity assessment for pharmaceutical 
products, among others. A chapter on Regulatory 
Cooperation commits both parties to further developing 
their regulatory cooperation to prevent and eliminate 
unnecessary barriers to trade and investment, including 
through pursuing regulatory compatibility and recognition 
of equivalence. Objectives of regulatory co-operation 
include building trust, deepening mutual understanding of 
regulatory governance approaches; promote transparency, 
predictability and efficacy of regulations; and avoiding 
unnecessary regulatory differences. A specific aim is to 
reduce unnecessary differences in sectoral regulation and 
to enhance the competitiveness of industry by looking 
for ways to reduce administrative costs and duplicative 
regulatory requirements, and “pursuing compatible 
regulatory approaches including, if possible and appropriate”, 
through “the recognition of equivalence or the promotion of 
convergence” (Art. 3[d][iii] Regulatory Cooperation chapter). 
Language on and examples of regulatory equivalence 
embodied in the CETA include a requirement that each party 
accept SPS measures of the exporting party as equivalent 
to its own if the exporting party “objectively demonstrates 
that its measures achieves the importing party’s appropriate 
level of protection” (SPS chapter, Art. 7.1, draft CETA 
text). Principles and guidelines for the determination of 
equivalence are set out in Annex IV to the SPS chapter, 
while Annex V lists areas in which parties have agreed there 
is equivalence. A specific task of the Joint Management 
Committee for SPS Measures is to prepare and maintain a 
document detailing the state of play on recognition of the 
equivalence of specific SPS measures.9 The CETA also calls for 
establishment of a Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF) to 
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facilitate and promote the realization of the objectives laid 
out in the Regulatory Cooperation chapter and calls on the 
parties to consult with stakeholders, including the research 
community, NGOs, business and consumer organizations “on 
matters relating to the implementation of” the Regulatory 
Cooperation chapter (Art. 8, Regulatory Cooperation 
chapter). 
The inclusion of regulatory cooperation in PTAs involving 
the US and EU raises numerous questions regarding the 
possible consequences for countries that are either excluded 
or that have no power to inﬂuence the negotiations on the 
substance of the rules that apply. Agreements that lead to 
regulatory convergence, mutual recognition, and acceptance 
that regimes are equivalent among PTA members may create 
incentives for companies to locate in a bloc, or to source 
from firms located within a bloc, to the detriment of outside 
firms. In the domain of regulation, more is required than the 
standard focus of trade agreements—disciplining the ability 
of a government to use a policy instrument. Instead, the 
agenda revolves around convergence of norms and standards 
and mutual recognition and acceptance that national 
enforcement systems are effective.
It remains to be seen if and how new vintage PTAs deal with 
the cost-raising effects of regulatory differences, and if they 
do, to what extent this will be detrimental to countries that 
are not members. Classic trade diversion costs generated 
by preferential removal of tariffs under the CETA, the TTP, 
or the TTIP are likely to be limited because average tariffs 
in most of the countries participating in these initiatives 
are low—indeed, in the case of the TPP, many already have 
free trade agreements with each other. That said, there is 
potential for discriminatory effects. How significant this will 
be depends on whether firms located in countries that are 
not members of the PTAs are able to benefit from access to 
the larger market created by the PTA by demonstrating that 
their products comply with the relevant regulatory standards. 
In practice, it may be difficult to exclude third-country 
firms from benefiting from initiatives that lower the fixed 
costs of enforcement of regulation in member countries.10 
9Regulatory measures cannot simply be abolished or their 
impacts on trade reduced by x percent as can be done for 
tariffs. In principle, they fulfill a specific social or economic 
purpose, even if the effect is to restrict trade. Addressing the 
trade effects of regulation requires first an understanding 
at the national level of the effects of prevailing policies and 
the likely impacts of alternative welfare-enhancing reforms. 
Many reforms will not require actions by other governments 
(trading partners), but international agreements may help 
mobilize political attention to an issue and overcome 
resistance by vested interests. International cooperation may 
also help governments identify beneficial reforms.
As mentioned, trade agreements are geared towards 
the negotiation of enforceable commitments. Binding 
disciplines reduce uncertainty for traders who know that the 
dispute settlement mechanism can be used to ensure that 
governments live up to what they sign on to. A precondition 
for agreement on binding international rules is a shared 
recognition that the negative spillovers associated with a 
policy (set of policies) are significant and that a proposed set 
of (enforceable) disciplines will result in greater efficiency 
(lower costs). Such an understanding exists when it comes 
to tariffs and related border barriers, but much less so when 
it comes to domestic policies that can generate market 
segmentation, raise costs, impede innovation, or otherwise 
give rise to negative spillovers. This suggests a necessary 
condition for international cooperation in the area of 
regulation is improving the transparency of applied policies; 
supporting independent analysis of the effects of policies; 
and establishing mechanisms through which governments 
can consult and exchange information (Hoekman 2015).
Insofar as more recent PTAs generate innovative approaches 
to attenuate the market-segmenting effects of differences 
in regulatory policies, they can help all countries identify 
approaches that can usefully be emulated. All WTO members 
have a strong interest in understanding what PTAs end 
up doing and achieving. Documenting and analyzing the 
approaches that are implemented by PTAs to reduce barriers 
would both help ensure transparency—potentially informing 
a process of learning about what works and what does 
not—and identify specific features of cooperation in PTAs 
that might be multilateralized. This is an important task 





Non-parties may benefit from PTAs that include regulatory 
disciplines and foster regulatory cooperation between 
Members if these apply on a non-discriminatory basis. But 
discrimination can still easily occur if third countries do not 
have access to recognized certification systems and therefore 
have to continue to incur market-specific conformity 
assessment and inspection costs. 
More generally, non-members may lose from the shift to 
PTAs and away from the WTO simply because they will 
have no say regarding new rule-making by a subset of the 
major traders. Their worry is legitimate—why would the 
transatlantic partners write their regulatory agenda with 
the interests of non-participants in mind? It is their own 
domestic political economy that can be expected to drive 
the agenda. Whatever the net welfare effects of any given 
PTA for Members and non-members, a shift towards regional 
deals and agreements among subsets of WTO Members 
that are not applied on a most favoured nation (MFN) basis 
and that do not operate under the umbrella of the WTO 
will imply greater fragmentation of the multilateral trading 
system.
Questions 
i. What are the (likely) implications and economic effects 
of PTAs that embody regulatory coherence, consultation, 
and cooperation? 
ii. If cooperation is an element of PTAs, do third parties have 
access? Is there discrimination, de facto if not de jure? 
iii. Is there a threat (evidence) that PTAs may undo what 
is today (has been) an open, multilateral process of 
cooperation on the development of international 
standards?
iv. How much of what is being considered or pursued in 
the PTA contexts is new as opposed to incorporating 
mechanisms that were already in place and that are being 
implemented by regulatory agencies concerned? What is 
the value added of a PTA? 
v. What should be learned from past/ongoing high-level 
efforts (Regulatory Cooperation Commission, Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum, and the like)? 
vi. What kind of regulatory coherence, consultation, 
and cooperation embodied in PTAs should/could be 
multilateralized? 
10
secretariat to take up, and more in general for monitoring 
and analysis of impacts by international organizations such as 
the OECD and World Bank. As things stand, all we formally 
know about PTAs at the WTO level is up to the moment a 
notified PTA is discussed before the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA). Once the train has left the 
station, the quantity of information decreases dramatically.
Going beyond greater transparency, more small-group 
cooperation can be pursued under the umbrella of the WTO. 
There are two alternative mechanisms for members to form 
clubs on an issue-specific agenda of common interest—
conclusion of a plurilateral agreement (PA) under Article II.3 
of the Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO and 
so-called critical mass agreements (CMAs). CMAs involve 
agreements where negotiated disciplines apply to only a 
subset of countries, but benefits are implemented on a MFN 
basis. Examples include initiatives such as the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) and other so-called zero-for-
zero agreements, in which a group of countries agree to 
eliminate tariffs for a specific set of products. There are also 
CMAs for services, for example, on basic telecommunications 
and on financial services under the GATS. PAs differ from 
CMAs in that they may be applied on a discriminatory basis—
that is, benefits need not be extended to non-signatories. 
There are currently two PAs incorporated into the WTO—
the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement.
PAs and CMAs differ from PTAs in important respects. 
WTO rules require that PTAs cover substantially all trade in 
goods and/or have substantial sectoral coverage of services. 
Conversely, CMAs and PAs can be issue-specific. PTAs tend 
to be closed clubs—most PTAs do not include an accession 
clause. Those PTAs that do allow for accession often restrict 
it to countries in a specific geographic region. This helps 
explain the proliferation of PTAs—a new agreement often 
tends to be negotiated between members of any given PTA 
and a non-member because it is not possible for a non-
member to join an existing regional trade agreement. CMAs 
and PAs in contrast are open in the sense that any WTO 
Member can join if it wants to and is able to implement the 
disciplines that are embodied in the agreement.
There are good reasons for attempting to do more via CMAs 
and PAs (Lawrence 2006; Hoekman and Mavroidis 2015). 
PAs cannot reduce the welfare of any country, including 
those that decide not to join, because their content must 
be approved by the WTO membership as a whole. PTAs are 
reviewed by the WTO, but there is no sanctioning of their 
content; the process is limited to supply of information. 
PAs are more transparent as they involve regular reporting 
on activities to the WTO membership as a whole. They 
imply less dispersion in rules and approaches—and thus 
transactions costs and trade diversion—than PTAs. Indeed, 
they offer a way to multilateralize elements of what may be 
covered in PTAs. Multiple PTAs dealing with the same subject 
matter often do so in ways that imply that the rules of the 
game for firms differ depending on the PTA that applies for See Art. X.9 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.11
a given trade ﬂow. In the case of a PA, there will only be one 
regime regulating a given subject matter.
There are two constraints that impede the feasibility of 
pursuing PAs under WTO auspices. The first of these is that 
there is no straightforward way for WTO members to pursue 
CMAs that involve deepening of disciplines on policies that are 
already subject to WTO rules but that they are willing to apply 
on a MFN basis. The second constraint is that incorporation 
of a PA into the WTO requires unanimity “exclusively by 
consensus,”11 which in practice is a major disincentive for 
countries to pursue this type of cooperation. It is unclear 
whether WTO Members will be willing to consider making it 
easier to pursue plurilateral cooperation under the umbrella of 
the organization and how this could be facilitated.
Questions
i. Are the APEC-OECD checklist for assessing regulatory 
coherence an adequate and a good basis for incorporation 
into the WTO as a core element of a multilateral 
agreement that applies to all WTO Members? Is the 
model that was established in the Agreement of Trade 
Facilitation one that could be emulated? 
ii. Would it be useful to create deliberation mechanisms 
that allow for participation by and interactions between 
civil society, regulators, and the business community? If 
so, should this be done in the WTO or elsewhere?
iii. What could be done to promote greater coherence 
through aid for trade? Is there a need for greater focus 
on transparency (compilation of information; making this 
more easily available)? Or should there be more effort to 
deliver and sustain trade-related technical assistance and 
capacity building? What scope exists for more public-
private partnerships in this area?
iv. What could be done to facilitate multilateralization of 
regulatory cooperation that occurs in PTAs? 
v. Do “clubs” in the WTO offer a useful mechanism to push 
forward on new areas (for example, digital economy; data 
transfers; privacy regulation)?
vi. What areas where international regulatory cooperation or 
standards setting is already being pursued could benefit 
from inclusion into a PA or CMA in the WTO? 
vii. What can/should be learned from the many extant efforts 
and mechanisms that are aimed at cooperation between 
regulatory agencies in designing international standards 
and that are independent of trade agreements? Could a 
set of good practices for regulatory cooperation become 
a form of sector-based international standard setting? If 
so, is there a role for the WTO here?
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There are two questions of paramount importance when 
discussing enforcement of international commitments, 
whether this takes the form of coherence, consultation, 
and/or cooperation commitments—who has the right to 
act as complainant, and before which court (forum)? Both 
questions can of course be contractually agreed. Home 
and Foreign can include a clause whereby they design both 
the forum as well as the agents with the right to act as 
complainant (and defendant). The WTO “default” solution is 
embedded in Art. 1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU, the agreement regulating dispute settlement in the 
WTO). It is WTO Members that can act as complainants 
and/or defendants. However, in two cases the WTO allows 
private parties to invoke WTO law before a national forum 
(not the WTO)—Art. X.3 GATT (customs procedures) and 
the “challenge procedures” embodied in the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). 
Right to sue: Assume Home agrees to consult with Foreign 
on state-sponsored standards before their enactment. In this 
scenario, only Foreign would be entitled to request Home 
to observe its obligation, in case it does not. Citizens do not 
have standing before a court of law to request the same. It 
could be that Home agrees to invite private agents to express 
their views before its national forum, or a bi-national forum 
(assume always a Home-Foreign contract).
Forum: If no forum has been provided for, enforcement 
will take the form of countermeasures, that is, Home will 
calculate the damage suffered by lack of implementation 
in our case (assuming this exercise is feasible), and then 
impose them. Foreign in a similar case can either react 
(countermeasures spiral) or take the case to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ, the Hague), which has “default” 
competence for any public international law issue.  
In a nutshell, the point is this,
•	 Trading	 nations	 can	 contractually	 agree	 on	 both	 the	
right to sue (who has standing) and the forum where 
complaints will be lodged.
•	 If	no	contractual	agreement	exists,	 then	 the	“nature”	of	
the obligation assumed will dictate the agents with the 
right to sue. 
•	 If	 no	 forum	 has	 been	 provided	 for	 either,	 then	
enforcement will take the form of countermeasures that, 
by virtue of customary law, have to be proportional to 
the damage suffered.
An important question concerns identification of the 
“institutional” actors, that is, should we confine the proposed 
set-up to a government-only forum, or should we make room 
for private interests as well to be represented? Whatever 
the concrete legal disciplines that may be agreed, which will 
depend on the “form” of coordination, two elements should 
be present—(i) transparency; and (ii) procedural steps to 
ensure cooperation. There are some useful precedents that 
could provide food for thought. 
Transparency: Lack of transparency can be fatal for 
sustaining cooperation. A very telling illustration is the 
Trondheim litigation in the GPA. Norway had failed to 
respect its transparency obligations under the agreement. 
The US found out, and prevailed in the subsequent GATT 
dispute, but had to be content with a Pyrrhic victory. All 
that the Panel requested from Norway was a promise never 
to repeat this behaviour. In practice, therefore, the only 
discipline to address past lack of transparency is future 
transparency, at least in this Panel’s view. The inclusion 
of the “challenge procedures” in the GPA was meant as 
response to this situation. In practice, what is needed is some 
sort of early warning system, a mechanism that will allow 
trading nations to “stop the clock” before it is too late (for 
example, a measure has been adopted without consultation).
Modern democracies cannot hide their regulatory process, 
so to some extent information regarding future regulatory 
steps will be disseminated. Then again, there are instances 
where things are more complicated. What if, for example, 
Home incorporates a market standard by reference into its 
regulations? And what if the standard has been developed 
by local matador(s) only and raises (foreign) rivals’ costs? 
Remedies against lack of transparency, realistically, cannot 
provide a deterrent effect. No one would agree to a “go back 
and start all over again”-type of remedy in case transparency 
has been violated. So, by backwards induction, we need to 
think of some sort of “lock in” mechanisms that will oblige 
states to follow regulatory routes that de facto observe 
transparency. A very drastic manner to do that would be to 
agree to a rule that no trade-related regulation/legislation 
can be voted into law in a national parliament if it has not 
first been presented for information in the bilateral forum 
where Home and Foreign participate. Home would face 
an absolute domestic remedy if it failed to observe this 
obligation. There are of course variations to this theme. 
These points apply as well to procedures, obligations, and 
commitments that are elements of regulatory cooperation.
The institutional players: Trade agreements are 
government to government contracts. Only sovereigns have 
the right to appear before WTO “courts;” the same is true 
of PTAs. There are, however, two elements that cast doubt 
on the correctness of this description in that private agents 
already have a (small) stake in the WTO discussion on 
regulatory cooperation.
•	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 disseminating	 information	 about	




cooperation, private parties have an opportunity to 
comment on TBT/SPS issues, for example. There is an 
obligation imposed on the WTO membership to allow 
for a period between provisional enactment and entry 
into force, during which the opinions of those affected 
by the act (law) are to be collected. There is no obligation 
to take them into account, but this could be the result 
because of other factors (repeat players, and so forth).
•	 And	 then	 there	 is	 the	 discussion	 we	 entertained	 above	
about private parties having the right to sue in national 
fora.
Questions
i. Is it necessary to move beyond a state-state dispute 
settlement? 
ii. What mechanisms could be envisaged to permit greater 
opportunities for the regulated and stakeholders to 
raise regulatory issues and invoke dispute settlement 
procedures?
iii. Who should have standing to bring cases?
iv. What alternative instruments could be considered to 
increase accountability of regulatory entities to pursue 
cooperation when this has been agreed by governments?
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and institutions to generate strategic analysis and 
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